


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Unsettling pasts: reconciliation and history in settler Australia

BAIN ATTWOOD

During the last three or four decades, settler societies have been forced to confront the nature of their colonial histories, as new political movements and new histories have provoked controversy over injustices committed in the past. Much contemporary discussion has come to resemble the ongoing debates about forgetting, responsibility, guilt, atonement and compensation in countries such as Germany.¹ This has proven enormously unsettling. Modern states are forged largely through historical narratives, which provide nations with a sense of being a moral community. As Gyanendra Pandey has observed, this is what ‘gives nationalisms their greater or lesser appeal and staying power’.² Consequently, a nation’s loss of certainty regarding its moral worth can threaten both national identity and identification with the nation. It can be argued that this is especially so in settler societies. Most states have problematic origins and have to undergo a transition from *de facto* coercive power to *de jure* authority, but this is perhaps more evidently the case for settler states since their origins are considered to be more recent.

In societies such as Canada, New Zealand and Australia, the foundational historical narratives that settler communities previously took for granted have been discredited by new national histories. This confrontation with the colonial past has been especially shocking in the Australian case, largely because its settler peoples, especially Anglo-Australians, ‘are not used to thinking of [their] history as contentious, morally compromised or volatile, as dangerous, as, say, Japanese or South African history’.³ Coming to terms with this past has been difficult in Australia, then, not just because of the nature of its past but because of the nature of its history-making during much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which assumed a form of forgetting or disremembering.⁴

Here, I will consider the nature of the history-making in Australia in the closing decades of the twentieth century, and analyse its implications for righting historical wrongs and achieving reconciliation. It can be argued that in Australia, as in many other countries during this period, at least two fundamentally different kinds of history-making have been at work. The first is history of a more or less conventional academic kind, which has often been complicit with the liberal democratic state of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and its goal of developing a ‘modern’ unitary nation. The second, closely related to a series of memorialising practices, might be given the name ‘subaltern pasts’ or ‘Aboriginal

histories', to adopt or adapt a term formulated by Dipesh Chakrabarty, who has argued:

Some constructions and experiences of the past stay 'minor' in the sense that their very incorporation into historical narratives converts them into pasts 'of lesser importance' vis-à-vis dominant understandings of what constitutes fact and evidence (and hence vis-à-vis the underlying principle of rationality) in the practices of professional history. Such 'minor' pasts are those experiences of the past that always have to be assigned an 'inferior' or 'marginal' position as they are translated into the academic historian's language. These are pasts that are treated ... as instances of human 'immaturity', pasts that do not prepare us for either democracy or citizenry practices because they are not based on the deployment of reason in public life ... Let me call these subordinated relations to the past 'subaltern' pasts. They are marginalised not because of any conscious intentions but because they represent moments or points at which the archive that the historian mines develops a degree of intractability with respect to the aims of professional history. In other words, these are pasts that resist historicisation.⁵

In recent years Aboriginal histories have contested the legitimacy of the nation state and exposed the fact that history is only one way of relating and relating to the past.⁶ It can thus be argued that the symbolic and material rectification of historical injustice requires recognition not only of the different rights of Indigenous peoples but also their different histories — and the futures they imagine. This will be considered by examining reconciliation in Australia and two historical narratives that can be called 'native title' and 'the stolen generations'.

Aboriginality, history and reconciliation

In the 1960s Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal political campaigners in Australia began demanding rectification of injustices in new ways. Most importantly, they claimed rights on the grounds of Aborigines' status as the Indigenous peoples, especially to land ('land rights') but also to shape their own destinies ('self-determination'). These demands both called up and called upon histories of difference of one kind or another, since Indigenous rights are inherently based on historical claims. These histories challenged the triumphalist and historicist logic of conventional settler history.⁷

At the same time that these political campaigns to redress historical injustices grew in strength, non-Aboriginal academic historians turned their attention to studying colonialism in Australia, producing accounts of colonialism that emphasised racism, the dispossession of Aboriginal peoples, the degradation of their culture and the denial of their rights on the one hand, and Aboriginal survival and Aboriginality on the other. From the 1970s onwards this new history began to circulate in an increasing number of forms in public arenas — monographs, essays, novels, plays, poetry, feature films, documentaries, exhibitions and so forth. Indeed, there was a veritable explosion in representations of the Aboriginal past. Yet, as we shall see, there was much that remained conventional in this particular history-making.

During much the same period Aboriginal people themselves increasingly took an interest in history and represented themselves and their own pasts and cultures in the form of life story, family history, dance, painting, photography, song and so on. (In this process, historians, as well as anthropologists and linguists, played an important role, in particular by collaborating with Aborigines in the production of oral histories of one kind or another.) In important respects these Aboriginal pasts or histories departed radically from those of conventional history, but for some time the implications of these differences were not readily apparent.

By the 1990s, this history-making had created considerable unsettlement among settler Australians. Because history is often understood as an account of the past that is completed and so unalterable, it provides, especially in the context of rapid change, a sense of order, and so any challenge to it can be unsettling, making what has long seemed familiar unfamiliar.⁸ Settler Australians have experienced a profound change in the way they understand the history of their nation. As Haydie Gooder has commented: 'Debates concerning who rightfully belongs and the conditions of that belonging now haunt contemporary Australia'.⁹ As a result, there has been a growing conviction among many Australians that the Aboriginal past is integral to any sense of Australia's future, even though Aboriginal people constitute a small minority — less than two per cent — of the Australian population. Concern about the implications of the new Australian history has been particularly intense among many conservatives, and new conservatives have responded by launching a 'history war'.¹⁰

The heightened significance of Aboriginal matters has owed much to the Australian nation state's appropriation of Aboriginality since the 1960s. Since Australia, like many nation states, has found it increasingly difficult to realise a distinctive sense of nationality in an age of deepening globalisation, it has turned to Aboriginality as a way of making good this deficit. Drawing on representations of Aboriginal culture that are inherently historical in nature, nationalists have articulated Aboriginality in terms of its apparent antiquity, primordially and primitivism¹¹ At much the same time, the presentation of radical Aboriginal demands for rights and sovereignty — and the resulting crisis of legitimacy for the nation state — forced federal governments in Australia to adapt their method of governing Aboriginal people. They ostensibly abandoned the postwar policy of assimilation and adopted a policy of self-determination. In order to justify granting different rights for Aboriginal people, the state had to nurture Aboriginal difference or Aboriginality through new cultural and political forms.¹²

This strategy was only partially successful, however. The Australian state has been unable to detach Aborigines and Aboriginality from the other dimension the past bestows — that of precedence — or to defuse the postcolonial struggle based on this. During the 1970s and 1980s, Aboriginal spokespersons continued to express political demands for Indigenous rights and sovereignty, and they increasingly did so in international forums where they had some power to embarrass Australia by bringing its reputation as a liberal democracy into question. In the late 1980s, relations between Aborigines and the Commonwealth government entered a state of crisis. The government had reneged on its commitment to introduce national land rights legislation and drawn back from consideration of a treaty or a compact. In this context, it proposed a formal process

of reconciliation between Aborigines and settler Australians, headed by a body called the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation (CAR), which was accepted by all the major parties represented in the Commonwealth parliament.

Shared history

The term 'reconciliation' was never really defined but the emphases of the Council were relatively clear. Arguably, it was primarily an exercise in nation-building. It sought to unify Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people within the Australian nation and refused to countenance any Aboriginal political demands that could not be accommodated readily by the unitary nation state, such as those requiring recognition of Aboriginal sovereignty. The secondary project of reconciliation — social justice or self-determination — was contained by the Council's nationalist project. Its 'vision statement' read: 'A united Australia which respects this land of ours, values the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander heritage, and provides justice and equity for all'.¹³

The differences and tension between these two projects were reflected in the Council's history work. Reconciliation and historical truth were believed to go hand in hand. The Council made 'Sharing Histories' one of its 'key issues'. This was defined as 'A sense of all Australians of a shared ownership of their history'. Most often, this was figured as a goal of 'shared history'. 'Disharmony and discord can be overcome', the Council claimed in 1993, 'when Australians... come together to better understand and learn about the history of division and oppression'.¹⁴

The Council's ideal of 'shared history' was cast in the traditional terms of the discipline. History was largely conceived as an objective body of historical knowledge that would include all the empirically testable facts, especially the ones previously excluded, which would be added together and assembled as an accurate and hence truthful account of the past. This would be taught to all Australian citizens but particularly settler Australians. This pedagogical goal was informed by a set of assumptions that had influenced two or more generations of historians working on the history of Aboriginal-settler relations in Australia, beginning with Charles Rowley, a historian charged with overseeing a large social science research program on Aboriginal people in the mid 1960s.¹⁵ As Henry Reynolds, a leading scholar in the field of 'Aboriginal history', has observed:

Much critical, revisionist history springs from a belief that Australia should do better and is capable of doing so. It is written in hope and expectation of reform, crafted in the confidence that carefully marshaled, clearly expressed arguments can persuade significant numbers of Australians to change their minds and redirect their sympathies. Beyond that confidence in individuals is a firm belief in the capacity of Australian democracy to respond to new ideas which in time can reshape politics and recast institutions, laws and customs.¹⁶

Reconciliation, therefore, articulated a national history that was new content-wise but quite conventional in terms of its form. It was a single, factual account of the nation's history, compiled by objective historical research, which would constitute a common or unified collective understanding of its past and so serve as

the basis for national reconciliation. So it is that we find Reynolds asking: 'Without some reconciliation of stories, some *convergence* of stories, it is hard to see how the broader agenda of reconciliation can be advanced. Is reconciliation possible between two peoples who fundamentally disagree about their shared past, who differ widely in their explanation of the reason why things are as they now are?'¹⁷ The answer was clear. Another leading proponent of 'Aboriginal history', Peter Read, contended: 'national reconciliation demands reconciled historical narratives'. In other words, reconciliationists held that Australia can only develop into a reconciled nation if both Aborigines and settler Australians embraced more or less the same historical narrative — that is, they had to acquire a 'shared history'.¹⁸

In this project, both peoples, as Dipesh Chakrabarty has observed, were expected 'to transcend the pulls of their respective identitarian affiliations in order to agree on the facts of an injustice committed in the past' and thus 'meet as equal citizens of some future Australia'.¹⁹ The Council's discussion paper *Sharing Histories*, which historians such as Reynolds played a role in formulating, asserted that there was to be 'a shared sense of history' among Australians, one which recognised that '[we] have, or can develop, a common sense of time and place through the created historical record'.²⁰

What was this 'shared history' to comprise? Informed by what CAR called 'the newer [academic] histories', reconciliationist history emphasised the grim truth about the colonisation of Australia: the refusal to recognise Aborigines as the original owners, the dispossession, destruction and displacement of Aboriginal people, the formal racial discrimination that followed and the marginalisation of Aborigines. Thus, CAR's 'brief look at a long history' (in its final report to the Commonwealth parliament) pointed out that the British colonies had been established 'without consent and without negotiating a fair deal with the original inhabitants. . . Many Aboriginal people were dispossessed and displaced from their lands, forced into reserves, and killed in battles for their land . . . As numbers declined and traditional lifestyles and cultures were disrupted, Aboriginal . . . peoples became marginalised'.²¹

As well as encouraging settler Australians to 'share' or 'own' this history of the colonial past, however, CAR exhorted non-Aboriginal Australians to 'share' Aboriginal peoples' *precolonial* history, a 'deep past' often represented as Aboriginal 'cultures and histories' or as 'heritage'. By doing this, the authors of *Sharing Histories* asserted, 'non-Indigenous Australians are able to lengthen and strengthen their association with this land'.²²

Just as CAR called upon Australians to acquire or own a shared historical narrative, it also tried to point out the ways in which Aboriginal and settler Australians had had a shared colonial past. However, given both the nature of the past and the academic historiography it drew upon, this was a very minor theme. More commonly, the Council sought to redeem the history of settler peoples in Australia by drawing upon histories of humanitarian endeavour, which were ready made for creating a sense of precedence and tradition among present-day supporters of reconciliation.²³ 'In the wider society, ever since the early days of colonisation and settlement', it argued, 'dissenting voices have been raised, arguing against the harsh treatment of Aboriginal . . . peoples and calling for recognition of their rights,

including for just agreements for land'. In its final report CAR presented this past in terms of a 'gradual awakening', propounding a history of progress in which non-Aboriginal Australians had repudiated the past by redressing its wrongs.²⁴

In this, as in many other respects, the Council's history-making was historicist in as much as it treated history in the manner the discipline has usually done, as largely a matter of the past. By insisting on the very temporal categories — past, present and future — that lie at the heart of its operations, history, it has been argued, creates a sense of distance between the past and present that tends to deny the presence of the past. Thus, CAR tended to cast historical wrongs as 'past wrongs' or 'the injustices of the past', and so these were somehow figured as though they are no longer present. At most it represented the plight of Aborigines today as 'the consequence of that history' or as 'a legacy of history' but not as some kind of continuation of it.²⁵

This is also true of much of the new academic historiography informing CAR's work. Too few settler histories show satisfactorily how the colonial past is still present. On the contrary, as Patrick Wolfe has contended, they have 'an insulating effect', representing colonisation as 'a past event' rather than a process that has continued and continues.²⁶ In particular, Gillian Cowlishaw argues, historians 'have filled a textual gap about our racial past, but they conceive of racism in such a way that it is not seen to be an organic and ongoing part of colonialism'; they have 'created a new silence regarding... this racism' by presenting 'a view of our own past that fills [settler Australians], as readers, with horror as the same time as it distances us from it'.²⁷

Sharing histories

'Shared history' can be contrasted with another, subordinate theme in the Council's history work, that of 'sharing histories'. The assumptions informing 'sharing histories' differ in significant ways to those underpinning the concept of 'shared history'. As its name suggests, 'sharing histories', like 'shared history', called for the sharing of history through telling and listening to historical narratives. However, in such an exchange, it mostly had in mind Aboriginal people's tellings of their pasts, whereas 'shared history' tended to emphasise the teachings of academic history. More importantly, 'sharing histories' conceived of history as a matter of perspective, of interpretive narratives, rather than as a singular and consensual body of facts whose compilation by historical narrators tended to be occluded.²⁸

In keeping with this, many Aboriginal people, at least, seem to have seen reconciliation as a forum in which differently-positioned peoples told their histories, heard those of others, and respected their differences rather than rushing towards a future state of 'togetherness'. This conception of history, unlike 'shared history', explicitly realises and confirms the conjunction between past and present. As Heather Goodall has reminded us, histories are not so much collections of facts that naturally belong together as they are processes in which interpretive narratives are formulated and mobilised, and so they are 'always contingent on the teller, their purpose, the context and the audience to whom they speak'. By recognising this, it can be argued, one is more able to acknowledge the connectedness between

past and present and thus people's current predicaments and so understand why people's histories are relevant to the present.²⁹

In turn, 'sharing histories' acknowledges the simple fact that not only are there different historical perspectives of the colonial past but that these will continue to be articulated. It thus assumes that the future of any 'reconciliation' process will depend on a recognition and acceptance of ongoing difference — and so a good measure of contradiction and conflict — rather than involving an attempt to effect closure on a divided 'past'. In keeping with the politics of difference underpinning this approach, 'sharing histories' is clearly informed by an ideal of democracy that departs from that which inflects 'shared history'. Whereas the latter emphasises development towards a final goal of a unitary nation, the former stresses diversity and a state of ongoing pluralism, thus allowing for 'self-determination' in some form or another.

The different conceptions of history associated with 'shared history' and 'sharing histories', and their implications for historical justice, can be considered further by reference to the historical narratives I have called 'native title' and 'the stolen generations', both of which became central to the discourse of reconciliation in Australia.

Native title

In 1992 the Australian High Court recognised native title in Australia in its *Mabo* decision, thus vanquishing the previous legal interpretation that Aboriginal people were not the original owners of the country. *Mabo* was hailed as a historic decision by liberals, embraced by the Labor federal government and the popular reconciliation movement as the basis for reconciliation, and portrayed as a means of making a series of radical changes in Aboriginal affairs. Closer examination of both the High Court's ruling and the government's implementation of it, however, reveal that 'native title' was burdened by many of the same weaknesses as reconciliation's 'shared history', principally because it sought to contain a disturbingly different Aboriginal past or history.

On the face of it, the High Court's decision both confirms and evidences the virtues of conventional historical work proclaimed and undertaken by Charles Rowley in the 1960s and extended by a bevy of historians in the 1970s and 1980s. It seems that historical scholarship, rationally argued, carefully researched and well evidenced by empirical facts, had delineated the injustices of the past and persuaded the highest court in the land of the need to redress these, thus effecting a turn away from the bad past and towards a good future. For example, in their judgment William Deane and Mary Gaudron contended that a 'conflagration of oppression and conflict... [had] spread across the continent to dispossess, degrade and devastate the Aboriginal peoples'. These events, they argued further, 'constitute[d] the darkest aspects of the history of this nation' and had left 'a national legacy of unutterable shame'. As such, they declared, 'the nation as a whole must remain diminished unless and until there is an acknowledgment of, and retreat from, those past injustices'.³⁰ There is, indeed, something to be said for this history of progress: The High Court's decision is inconceivable without the

change that has taken place in Australian intellectual and cultural life since the 1960s, and the new Australian history did play a role in this.

More especially, it has been claimed that Henry Reynolds' 1987 study, *The Law of the Land*, swayed the majority of the High Court judges by questioning the previous legal orthodoxy regarding British acquisition of the land in Australia. Reynolds' history was, it has been remarked, 'the kind of history that the law can take notice of' since it presents 'a sustained, carefully documented and compelling argument'. That is, a historian, using scientific methods, showed the past as it really was and so produced an objective historical truth — the kind of history the law respects.³¹

However, there are many aspects of both Reynolds' history and the High Court's decision that limited their radical potential.³² At the same time as Reynolds made a historical case for the recognition of native title and the Court recognised these rights to land, both upheld the sovereignty of the Australian nation *vis-à-vis* that of Aboriginal people. This, they more or less asserted, was a matter of history — a matter that had been determined by the past and so no longer available to be challenged.³³ Both Reynolds and the High Court were similarly colonial in upholding the law of the colonisers in as much as they attributed the earlier denial of Aboriginal rights to land to bad law-making by the colonial state rather than to the law itself.³⁴ In other words, they claimed that the long period in which Aboriginal rights to land were not recognised was merely the result of a mistake or lapse in legal practice — the application of the legal doctrine *res nullius* or *terra nullius* — rather than something fundamental to Anglo-Australian law, let alone the nature of settler colonialism more generally. Consequently, as Elizabeth Povinelli has observed, the High Court could represent its decision as 'the fulfillment of the promise of the common law and the national civilisation for which it stands'.³⁵ In this regard both Reynolds' history and the High Court's judgment can be regarded as revamped forms of Whig history, 'a narrative form deeply familiar to Anglo-settler culture', which emphasises normative principles and is devoted to the notion of a benevolent state.³⁶

At the same time, in keeping with the historicism embedded in historical practice, both Reynolds and the Court distanced themselves from the colonial past. While Reynolds joined past and present together in many respects, arguing for example that settler Australians had not 'escaped ... the same problems which exercised the minds and troubled the consciences of their forebears six or so generations ago', he distanced them from colonial racism by failing to figure this as an organic and ongoing structure in which they had much invested. For his part, Justice Gerard Brennan, the author of the lead judgment in *Mabo*, asserted: 'it is imperative that in today's world that the common law should neither be nor seen to be frozen in an age of racial discrimination. The fiction [of *terra nullius*] was justified by a policy which has no place in the contemporary law of this country'.³⁷ By presenting its decision in this way, as though it was passing judgement on the practices of some *ancien regime*, the High Court created the pretence that it was constituting a new order. 'In their eyes', Povinelli observes, '*Mabo* rejected past (pre)judicial racial and cultural intolerance and now recognised native title to be a legitimate part of a newly reconstituted nation'. It thus achieved, she points out, 'a commonsense (post)racist separation' from the colonial past, 'entrench[ing] an

understanding of the nation as confronting its own discriminatory practices and facing up and eliminating the dark stain on its own history'. Yet, as Povinelli points out, *Mabo* amounted to a mere 'rewriting of history' rather than an actual 'recognition of and accounting for that history'.³⁸

The approach of the Keating Labor government was more or less the same as that of the High Court. Prime Minister Paul Keating talked *Mabo* up as 'an historic decision' because he hoped the Court's ruling could serve as a new (post)colonial historical narrative for the Australian nation: 'The Court's decision rejected a lie and acknowledged a truth. The lie was *terra nullius* — the convenient fiction that Australian had been a land of no one. The truth was native title'. This provided the possibility for a new foundation for Australia, he claimed, 'because after 200 years, we will at last be building on the truth'. Yet Keating, like the High Court, saw *Mabo* as an opportunity 'to transcend the history of dispossession' rather than work through the consequences of this past. Furthermore, while Keating celebrated the deep Aboriginal past as 'the oldest culture in the world' and claimed it as 'a wellspring of our national culture', his government insisted that native title only existed insofar as Australian law had or would recognise it. 'Native title land', Keating assured the Commonwealth Parliament, 'is... kept fully within the reach of Australian law'. In this way, he explained, 'Aboriginal Australians [will be given] justice but... in a way that [not only] keeps the country cohesive' but actually moves us 'closer to a united Australia'. Thus, the threat presented by the difference constituted by an Aboriginal past or history was contained by the Australian nation state.³⁹

The stolen generations

These historical narratives regarding native title might be contrasted with 'the stolen generations narrative'. In 1995 the Keating government directed Australia's Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) to undertake a national inquiry into the removal of Indigenous children: 'the stolen generations'. The Commission was determined to use the inquiry 'to reveal [the] history [of removals] and the devastating impact it continues to have on the lives of the stolen generations'. It urged Aboriginal people to participate by sharing their histories in the form of written submissions and oral testimony, and it went to considerable lengths to help the stolen generations tell their histories as the inquiry moved around Australia conducting public and private hearings.⁴⁰

HREOC also played a major role in shaping the histories presented to it. Its publicity for the hearings emphasised narratives of a particular kind of experience, that of loss and suffering, which it called 'trauma' and which we might call, following Homi Bhabha, 'affective histories'.⁴¹ The inquiry called forth a distinctive kind of history-telling, that of individual testimony. 'Testimony', Shoshana Felman has claimed, 'has become the crucial mode of our relation to events of the times'.⁴² Certainly in much contemporary culture, as Jay Winter has pointed out, 'the notion of the 'witness' [has] received [a] kind of validation': 'The person who suffered knows about a mystery — the mystery of evil and the miracle of survival — and we who listen may thereby enter the mystery and share the miracle'.⁴³ Testimony, in other words, privileges witnesses who 'tell it how it was'

and so bear 'the truth about history'. This made the inquiry's public hearings extraordinarily powerful affective events, resembling to some degree those of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. (The Australian inquiry was, in all likelihood, influenced by the South African Commission as well as other models for the public expiation of historical wrongs.)⁴⁴ The 'predominant themes' of the inquiry, HREOC emphasised in its report later, were 'Grief and loss'.⁴⁵ The narrative style of the Commission's report, *Bringing Them Home*, continued the emphasis on personal testimony by including short accounts of forced removal. In doing so, it 'made a claim on the nation', shocking it into listening.⁴⁶

Officially released during the Council's National Reconciliation Convention in May 1997, the report immediately became a lead story in the media and won a large and sympathetic nation-wide audience. Its account of the history of the stolen generations was widely available in the form of *Bringing Them Home*, a near-700 page tome which sold astonishingly well, a web version, a smaller booklet, and a video; and its findings were debated in the national and state parliaments and featured in stories and commentaries in newspapers and on radio and television. In short, the Commission's report reached a public that had not previously encountered this history and who had been relatively unmoved by the academic histories of colonialism published in the previous two decades. 'No inquiry in recent Australian history', one political commentator claimed, 'had a more overwhelming reception nor, at least in the short term, a more culturally transforming impact'.⁴⁷ This history disturbed many Australians, confronting them with 'the terrible realisation that even in their life times Aborigines were the victims of brutal racism'.⁴⁸

The impact of HREOC's inquiry and its report clearly owed much to both the form and content of the history it was sharing. In this respect it had much in common with the Aboriginal histories that had been produced in Australia across the preceding 20 or more years. The pasts these represent differ radically from those of academic history in some respects, and so a consideration of their nature helps us understand the difficulty of trying to 'reconcile' histories and, therefore, peoples.

Memory and history

How do these Aboriginal histories differ from those of conventional history?⁴⁹ The defining characteristic of Aboriginal histories, as for other Indigenous histories, is their form, which is predominantly that of oral history.⁵⁰ When historians began to work with 'oral history' in the 1970s they assumed it would supplement the sources they traditionally used and so assist in their democratic project of recovering those peoples 'hidden from history'. As such, 'oral history' seemed to pose no great threat to the discipline's practices. However, as historians soon discovered, any serious engagement with 'oral history' involves an encounter with memory. This caused a realisation, in Dipesh Chakrabarty's words, that '[f]ar from being simply complementary to each other, memory and history tell of very different relationships to the past than we can or do possess'; while history and memory are related and the ground between them has shifted so they have become

increasingly entangled with one another, 'they are not the same'.⁵¹ In short, as Paula Hamilton has pointed out, doing oral history with Aboriginal people 'changed the relationship between past and present in historical research'.⁵²

How do memory and history have 'very different relationships to the past'? Even though one always reaches the past in conventional historical work 'by starting out from the present' and one is 'always concerned with the meanings of historical reality for us, now',⁵³ the historian, deemed to be an outsider, strives to represent the past as it happened and to realise the past's alterity — its difference from present times. This procedure usually rests on an assumption that the past is past and this encourages the historian to treat present and past as disjunctive or at the very least to attend to discontinuities more than continuities between them. The historian's focus on explanation of events — on causes or origins — more than on outcomes or effects also distances the historian from the past as it directs him or her to concentrate on what leads up to the past rather than on the consequences of that past. Likewise, distance is created by the tendency of conventional history to subordinate experience or the lived to the conceptual and the analytical. Furthermore, by assuming that time is comprised of clearly differentiated categories of 'past', 'present' and 'future' — and that the relationship between them is linear or evolutionary — the historian treats the present and future as though these times move inexorably away from the past, propelled for the most part by autonomous human agents. Finally, in the task of understanding, the historian assumes the past can be comprehended and apprehended. Thus mastered, it can be put to rest, made to pass away. This distancing of the past has diminished over the last 40 years as 'social history' or 'history from below' has paid attention to the historical *experience* of people, but it still remains.

In memory work, it can be argued, the past is not so much represented or re-presented as it is presented or presenced by a personal narrator, an insider who tends to make the past familiar as they try to make sense of it in the present. Thus, in memory work, narrating the past is incontrovertibly a matter of perspective. Indeed, this, and not some purportedly independent or objective account, mostly comprises its *raison d'être*. In re-membering the past to compose him or herself in the present the narrator mostly seeks continuities between past and present, tends to deny discontinuities and refuses to admit any sense of alterity. Present and past are brought into greater proximity; 'then' and 'now' get entangled with one another. This can challenge history's notion of linear or evolutionary development, and thus of progress. This is especially so, it has been argued (most famously in the case of the Jewish Holocaust), with 'traumatic memory'.⁵⁴ Here, the past resists historicisation and assumes such presence that it lacks and denies any sense of its 'pastness', thereby obliterating any differentiation or disjunction between past and present.⁵⁵ In memory, especially traumatic memory, moreover, the agency or autonomy of the subject is severely diminished, just as any sense of a narrator's mastery of the past is replaced by a sense of the incomprehensibility and therefore irreducibility of 'the past'. Here the past can readily seem to be (the) present and something that will not pass away.

In memory work, it might also be argued, there can be a greater variety of pasts because perspective predominates. A narrator tries to create an account that is

truthful to *their* past and so one gets many pasts, whereas the goal of the omniscient academic historian has been to produce one past, winnowing its records in order to discover that which he or she deems to be the most accurate.⁵⁶ At the same time, it has been argued, memory tends to particularise and individualise, in Gyanendra Pandey's words, 'specifying sites and bodies that carry the marks of particular events, making [things] real in everyday, physical, nameable terms', whereas the historian largely seeks to generalise, thus tending to render the past relatively abstract.⁵⁷ Memory work's tendency to multiple the number of historical accounts is all the greater because so much of it is bound up with a form of identity politics other than that of one of its earlier forms, which is that concerning the nation. It thus tends to favor a different direction in democratic politics to the one history has traditionally supported, moving towards diversity rather than a unitary nation-state.⁵⁸

Divided histories

The impact of *Bringing Them Home*, as I have indicated already, owed much to the fact that its historical narrative was predominantly formed by memory work rather than history work and especially memory work that took the form of testimony or witnessing.⁵⁹ It was this that gave the past of the stolen generations a presence that no conventional historical work had been able to bestow on the history of colonialism in Australia. Consequently, *Bringing Them Home* caused considerable unsettlement in various quarters. On the one hand, many conservatives were troubled, indeed outraged, by its historical interpretation of a recent Australian past.⁶⁰ They were vexed, though, not only by the different past this history related but the different relationship *to* the past that it presented. As such, they and the recently elected federal conservative government, which had already launched an attack on an Aboriginal history that that allegedly cast Australia's history in overly 'critical' rather than 'monumental' terms (to apply Nietzsche's typology of history), worked hard to try and distance the present from this intractable past. On the other hand, the inquiry's call for an apology became the cause celebre for the reconciliation movement, all the more so because of the conservative Commonwealth government's refusal to give one.

Of particular interest here, though, is the fact that the Commission's history-making, like that of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, attracted considerable criticism across the political spectrum. The HREOC inquiry had, as I remarked earlier, encouraged a historical approach that emphasised testimony and thus a notion of historical knowledge that construes truth as a matter of subjectivity and so perspective, but at the same time the overview it presented in *Bringing Them Home* was done in the name of traditional notions of historical truth and so presented it as objective, impartial and authoritative. Academic historians such as myself claimed that there were serious weaknesses in the Commission's historical work,⁶¹ just as historians have alleged in reference to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's history-making.⁶² It was objected that memory and history are similar in many respects but also quite different and that the distinction between historical truth and falsehood would be endangered if one lost sight of this.⁶³ It was, and is, a point difficult to refute. Conventional

historical work is, generally speaking, more reliable than memorial work in establishing what happened in the past.⁶⁴

Such criticism, however, tended to overlook or ignore another point we have registered — the historical truths of *Bringing Them Home* were rather different to those produced by conventional history, referring more to the past's residue in the present than to the pastness of the past.⁶⁵ It raised the thorny question of how different historical narratives might be handled or negotiated in a pluralist liberal democracy.

'Reconciling' histories

This clash of historical truths illustrates the phenomenon this paper has been exploring: the fact that at least two different forms of history-making were and are at work in many democratic nation states today. They cannot be 'reconciled' without considerable epistemic violence being done to one or the other.

The problem with 'shared history', I have argued, is that the state insists that everyone should have the same kind of history. It forecloses on reconciliation by insisting that all parties should adopt the conflicted past that actually divides them. In other words, it demands a shared future in which different histories and different historical identities dissolve into one another. This is a badly flawed conception of reconciliation. As long as any society contains at least two cultural traditions, one that identifies with the colonisers and another with the colonised, it is inevitable that there will be conflicting attitudes, opinions and feelings about the colonial past.⁶⁶ It also rests on a questionable assumption that the most important truths are factual, empirically proven ones instead of moral and interpretive ones. Rather than bemoan these realities, it makes more sense to acknowledge that the liberal ideal of a unified nation state, like the old academic historian's ideal of objectivity, is but a noble dream and to recognise that different histories are maintained because '[historical] truth is tied to . . . collective identity'.⁶⁷ As Michael Ignatieff has commented:

The idea that reconciliation depends on shared truth presumes that shared truth about the past is possible. But truth is related to identity. What you believe is true depends, in some measure, on who you believe yourself to be . . . People . . . do not easily or readily surrender the premises upon which their lives are based . . . Resistance to historical truth is a function of group identity.⁶⁸

This means, as Richard Mulgan has argued, that any 'reconciliation' between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people

cannot be expected to [involve agreement on] all aspects of the past. . . A more sensible. . . path is to admit the continuing existence of some conflicting cultural perspectives but to moderate and accommodate them through shared commitment to certain political values, such as democratic principles and human rights, including Aboriginal rights.

'In such a context', he concludes, 'the key terms should not be words like "reconciliation" and "consensus", which imply the transcending of disagreement, so much as "accommodation" and "compromise", terms that recognise, and

legitimate, the existence of conflicting values and interests, though within a framework of peaceful mutual adjustment'.⁶⁹

What does this mean for work on the past? First, academic or professional historians need to recognise the limits of their own discipline, accepting that it is, as Dipesh Chakrabarty has remarked, 'only one among [many] ways of remembering the past', and that it is a 'limited good'. Second, historians will have to curb their discipline's imperial tendencies towards other ways of relating (to) the past. By acknowledging these matters, Chakrabarty suggests, we will be more able to 'allow ... a certain measure of equality between [our] histories and other constructions of the past'.⁷⁰ For their part the producers of subaltern or Aboriginal pasts might recognise the limited good of their narratives, acknowledging that if history has a tendency to impede understanding of the ongoing influence of the past and its contemporary meanings for people, memory has a tendency to cloud understanding of that past as it was. Most importantly, we will have to consider *how* different historical narratives can talk to one another and *what* they are going to be talking about so that there can be a basis for ongoing dialogue — for mutually unsettling exchanges of diverse histories — rather than the development of a final settlement, some final (re)resolution of the past for the present.

Notes

- ¹ Mark McKenna, 'Metaphors of light and darkness: the politics of "black armband history"', *Melbourne Journal of Politics*, 25, 1998, p 70.
- ² Gyanendra Pandey, *Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p 152.
- ³ David Carter, 'Working on the past, working on the future', in *Becoming Australian*, Richard Nile and Michael Peterson (eds), St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1998, p 12.
- ⁴ W E H. Stanner, *The 1968 Boyer Lectures: After the Dreaming*, Sydney: Australian Broadcasting Commission, 1969, pp 7, 24–25, 53. It should be noted that historical and other discourses are very important in the Australian context because the vast majority of its non-Aboriginal peoples only 'know' Aborigines through these. See Marcia Langton, 'Well, I Heard it on the Radio and I Saw it on the Television ...': *An Essay for the Australian Film Commission on the Politics and Aesthetics of Filmmaking by and about Aboriginal People and Things*, Sydney: Australian Film Commission, 1993, p 33.
- ⁵ Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincialising Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, pp 100–101.
- ⁶ Richard White, 'Using the past: history and Native American studies', in *Studying Native Americans: Problems and Prospects*, Russell Thornton (ed.), Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1998, p 217.
- ⁷ See Bain Attwood, *Rights for Aborigines*, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2003, Part V.
- ⁸ See Ken Gelder and Jane Jacobs, *Uncanny Australia: Sacredness and Identity in a Postcolonial Nation*, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1998, pp 17, 22.
- ⁹ Haydie Gooder, 'Review of Peter Read, *Belonging*', *Australian Historical Studies*, 32(117), 2001, p 356.
- ¹⁰ For a discussion of this, see Bain Attwood, *Telling the Truth about Aboriginal History*, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2005, Chapter Three.
- ¹¹ See Bain Attwood, 'Introduction: the past as future: Aborigines, Australia and the (dis)course of history', in *In the Age of Mabo: History, Aborigines and Australia*, Bain Attwood (ed.), Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1996, pp vii–xxxviii.
- ¹² See Jeremy Beckett, 'Aboriginality, citizenship and the nation state', *Social Analysis*, 24, 1988, pp 3–18.
- ¹³ Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation (henceforth CAR), *Walking Together: The First Steps*, < www.austlii.edu.au/other/IndigLRes/car/1994/1/2 > . Reconciliation has been the subject of several critiques. See, for example, Haydie Gooder and Jane Jacobs, 'Belonging and non-belonging: the apology in a reconciling nation', in *Postcolonial Geographies*, Alison Blunt and Cheryl McEwan (eds), New York: Continuum, 2002, pp 200–213. For a contrary view, see John Morton, 'Abortive redemption?

- apology and Indigenous tradition in Australian reconciliation', *Journal of the Polynesian Society*, 112(3), 2003, pp 238–259.
- ¹⁴ CAR, *Walking Together; CAR, Addressing the Key Issues for Reconciliation*, < www.austlii.edu.au/other/IndigLRes/car/1993/9/2 > .
- ¹⁵ See C D Rowley, *The Destruction of Aboriginal Society*, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1970, pp 5, 8–9.
- ¹⁶ Henry Reynolds, *Why Weren't We Told?: A Personal Search for the Truth About Our History*, Melbourne: Viking, 1999, p 245.
- ¹⁷ Reynolds, *Why Weren't We Told?*, p 171, my emphasis.
- ¹⁸ Peter Read, *Belonging: Australians, Place and Aboriginal Ownership*, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p 186.
- ¹⁹ Dipesh Chakrabarty, 'Reconciliation and its historiography: some preliminary thoughts', *UTS Review*, 7(1), 2001, p 11.
- ²⁰ CAR, *Sharing History*.
- ²¹ CAR, *Reconciliation: Australia's Challenge: Final Report of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation to the Prime Minister and the Commonwealth Parliament*, < www.austlii.edu.au/other/IndigLRes/car/2000/16 > .
- ²² CAR, *Sharing History*.
- ²³ For an example of such a history, see Henry Reynolds, *This Whispering in Our Hearts*, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1998.
- ²⁴ CAR, *Sharing History*; CAR, *Reconciliation*.
- ²⁵ CAR, *Addressing the Key Issues*; CAR, *Walking Together*; CAR, *Australian Declaration Towards Reconciliation*, < www.austlii.edu.au/other/IndigLRes/car/2000/12 > . Perhaps it is not altogether surprising, therefore, that most settler Australians, even those who acknowledge that Aboriginal people are disadvantaged, do not understand the historical causes of this. Public opinion polls show that they 'do not believe that there is a link between current disadvantage and the past' even though there is 'a widespread feeling throughout Australia that Aborigines have been badly treated in the past' (Saulwick & Muller, 'Public opinion on Reconciliation', in *Reconciliation: Essays on Australian Reconciliation*, Michelle Grattan (ed.), Melbourne: Black Inc, 2000, p 36).
- ²⁶ Patrick Wolfe, 'Nation and miscegeNation: discursive continuity in the post-Mabo era', *Social Analysis*, 36, 1994, p 96. See also Klaus Neumann, 'Remembering victims and perpetrators', *UTS Review*, 4(1), 1998, pp 8–12.
- ²⁷ Gillian Cowlshaw, 'Studying Aborigines: changing canons in anthropology and history', in *Power, Knowledge and Aborigines*, Bain Attwood and John Arnold (eds), Melbourne: La Trobe University Press, 1992, pp 26–27.
- ²⁸ CAR, *Addressing the Key Issues*.
- ²⁹ Heather Goodall, 'Too early or not soon enough?: reflections on sharing histories as process', *Australian Historical Studies*, 33(118), 2002, p 12.
- ³⁰ 'Mabo v Queensland No. 2', *Australian Law Journal Reports*, 66, 1992, pp 449, 451.
- ³¹ Rosemary Hunter, 'Aboriginal histories, Australian histories, and the law', in *In the Age of Mabo*, Attwood (ed.), p 5. For a consideration of Reynolds' *The Law of the Land* and this matter, see my 'The Law of the Land or the law of the land?: history, law and narrative in a settler society', *History Compass*, 2, 2004, pp 1–27.
- ³² The High Court's ruling was very limited. At the same time as it acknowledged native title it upheld Australian sovereignty and determined that native title had been legitimately extinguished in much of Australia, that compensation was not payable for this expropriation, and that Aboriginal claimants have to demonstrate they have maintained a continuing relationship to their 'traditional' land (which few have been able to do).
- ³³ In a later book Reynolds challenged the sovereignty of the Australian nation state: *Aboriginal Sovereignty: Reflections on Race, State and Nation*, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1996.
- ³⁴ It can be argued, as more than one legal historian has done, that the judges were 'primarily concerned with correcting legal history' and so their ruling was an exercise in the legitimation of the rule of law. In other words, it makes more sense to conclude that the Court was eventually forced by 'the crisis of [historical] truth' to 'bring [the] law into line with the now-acknowledged 'facts' of history', not so much to redress historical injustice but 'in order to restore the law's legitimacy' (Hunter, 'Aboriginal Histories', pp 1, 16; David Ritter, 'The "rejection of terra nullius" in Mabo: a critical analysis', *Sydney Law Review*, 18(1), 1996, p 7).
- ³⁵ Elizabeth Povinelli, 'The state of shame: Australian multiculturalism and the crisis of Indigenous citizenship', *Critical Inquiry*, 24(2), 1998, p 579.
- ³⁶ Paul McHugh, 'Law, history and the Treaty of Waitangi', *New Zealand Journal of History*, 31(1), 1997, pp 40, 46, 54, 56.
- ³⁷ 'Mabo', p 422.
- ³⁸ Povinelli, 'State of Shame', pp 579, 588–589, 592.
- ³⁹ Paul Keating, 'The Redfern Park Speech' (1992), in *Reconciliation*, Grattan (ed.), p 62; Keating, *Address to the Nation: 15 November 1993*, Canberra: Government Printer, 1993, p 5; Commonwealth of Australia, House

of Representatives, *Parliamentary Debates*, First Session, 1993, pp 2877, 2880, 2882–2883; *Age*, 29 April 1993, 14 June 1993.

⁴⁰ Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (henceforth HREOC), *Information Paper on the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families*, p 1, cited in Link Up and Jan Tikka Wilson, *In the Best Interests of the Child?: Stolen Children: Aboriginal Pain/White Shame*, Canberra: Aboriginal History Inc, 1997, p 9.

⁴¹ Homi Bhabha, cited Chakrabarty, *Provincialising Europe*, 19.

⁴² Shoshana Felman, 'Education and crisis, or the vicissitudes of teaching', in *Trauma: Explorations in Memory*, Cathy Caruth (ed.), Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, p 16.

⁴³ Jay Winter, 'The memory boom in contemporary historical studies', *Raritan*, 21(1), 2001, p 56.

⁴⁴ Paula Hamilton, 'Sale of the century?: memory and historical consciousness in Australia', in *Contested Pasts: The Politics of Memory*, Katharine Hodgkin and Susannah Radstone (eds), London: Routledge, 2003, p 143.

⁴⁵ HREOC, *Bringing Them Home: Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families*, Sydney: HREOC, 1997, p 3.

⁴⁶ Haydie Gooder and Jane Jacobs, "'On the border of the unsayable": the apology in postcolonising Australia', *Interventions*, 2(2), 2000, p 238.

⁴⁷ Robert Manne, *In Denial: The Stolen Generations and the Right*, Melbourne: Schwartz Publishing, 2001, p 5.

⁴⁸ Raimond Gaita, *A Common Humanity: Thinking About Love & Truth & Justice*, Melbourne: Text, 1999, p 110.

⁴⁹ For the sake of making my argument clear in this section I have overstated the differences between history and memory, between historical and memorial work.

⁵⁰ Although many are published, most begin as oral histories and are only later transcribed and edited for publication.

⁵¹ Chakrabarty, 'Reconciliation and its historiography', pp 9–10.

⁵² Hamilton, 'Sale of the century', p 145.

⁵³ Allan Megill, 'Recounting the past: "description", explanation, and narrative in historiography', *American Historical Review*, 94(3), 1989, p 647; Jacques Le Goff, *History and Memory*, trans. Steven Rendall and Elizabeth Claman, New York: Columbia University Press, 1992, p xx.

⁵⁴ See, for example, Lawrence L. Langer, *Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991.

⁵⁵ Too much can be made of the past's presence in memory work. In other words, we should not lose sight of memory's discursivity, by which I mean the degree to which so much memory is shaped and thus re-presented by contemporary discourses, including history, most of which are closely connected to the politics of difference. As Luisa Passerini has reminded us, 'memory is above all a form of representation' ('Memories between silence and oblivion', in *Contested Pasts*, Hodgkin and Radstone (eds), p 238).

⁵⁶ 'Collective memory', however, tends to lessen the range of perspectives, as Peter Novick and others have pointed out. See Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999, pp 3–4.

⁵⁷ Pandey, *Remembering Partition*, pp 67, 88.

⁵⁸ Some of my argument in this and the two preceding paragraphs is informed by Pandey, *Remembering Partition*, p 189, and Chakrabarty, 'Museums in late democracies,' *Humanities Research*, IX(1), 2002, pp 7–8, 10.

⁵⁹ As I discuss in "'Learning about the truth": the stolen generations narrative', in *Telling Stories: Indigenous History and Memory in Australia and New Zealand*, Bain Attwood and Fiona Magowan (eds), Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2001, the stolen generations narrative that had emerged in the 1980s was the product of a collaboration between memory and history work but in the 1990s it was increasingly determined by memory and discourses other than history.

⁶⁰ See Manne, *In Denial*.

⁶¹ See Attwood, 'The stolen generations and genocide: Robert Manne's *In Denial*', *Aboriginal History*, 25, 2001, pp 163–172; Attwood, 'Learning about the truth', pp 208–211.

⁶² See Colin Bundy, 'The beast of the past: history and the TRC', in *After the TRC: Reflections on Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa*, Wilmot James and Linda van de Vijwer (eds), Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2000, pp 14–15, 17–19.

⁶³ This anxiety is apparent elsewhere. Notable examples include Peter Novick, Charles Maier and Kirwin Lee Klein. Maier and Klein have referred pejoratively to 'the memory industry', expressing their fears that it is a discourse that threatens to displace history and arguing that its rise marks 'a retreat from transformative politics' (Maier, 'A surfeit of memory: reflections on history, melancholy and denial', *History and Memory*, 5(2), 1993, p 150; Klein, 'On the emergence of memory in historical discourse', *Representations*, no. 69, 2000, p 127; Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life*, pp 1–15). Klein undoubtedly has a point, though, when he notes that excessive claims are now made on behalf of memory: 'Memory thus differentiates itself from "traditional" and "formal historical discourse" that has been "sanctioned or valorised by institutional frameworks"... [H]istory and memory break apart into an unstable chain of antinomies: History is modernism, the state, science, imperialism, andocentrism, a tool of oppression; memory is postmodernism, the "symbolically excluded", "the body", "a healing device and a tool for redemption". A series of inversions

provide drama: slave defeats master, female topples male, and the local resists the universal. The language enlists “postmodernism” in the service of transcendence, emplotted as a narrative process of “trauma”, “catharsis” and “redemption” (“On the emergence of *memory*”, p 138). Nevertheless, it is evident that Klein’s remarks are themselves quite excessive.

- ⁶⁴ Accounts drawing on memory often suffer from serious omissions, inaccuracies and distortions since they ‘tell us not just what people did, but what they wanted to do, what they believed they were doing, what they now think they did’ (Alessandro Portelli, ‘The peculiarities of oral history’, *History Workshop Journal*, 12, 1981, pp 99–100).
- ⁶⁵ This is also true of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. It claimed several kinds of truth — which it called ‘factual or forensic truth; personal or narrative truth; social or ‘dialogue truth’ . . . and healing or restorative truth’ — were operating in its hearings (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report*, New York: Macmillan, 1999, vol. 1, chap 5, para 29). For a critical discussion of this, see Deborah Posel, ‘The TRC report: what kind of history? What kind of truth?’, in *Commissioning the Past: Understanding South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission*, Deborah Posel and Graeme Simpson (eds), Witwatersrand: University of Witwatersrand Press, 2002, pp 147–172.
- ⁶⁶ Richard Mulgan, ‘Citizenship and legitimacy in postcolonial Australia’, in *Citizenship and Indigenous Australians: Changing Conceptions and Possibilities*, Nicolas Peterson and Will Sanders (eds), Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p 193.
- ⁶⁷ Heribert Adam and Kanya Adam, ‘The politics of memory in divided societies’, in *After the TRC*, James and van de Vijwer (eds), p 44.
- ⁶⁸ Michael Ignatieff, *The Warrior’s Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience*, London: Vintage, 1999, pp 173–174, 185.
- ⁶⁹ Mulgan, ‘Citizenship and Legitimacy’, p 193. Mulgan, as Morton would argue, tends to play down the fact that ‘peaceful mutual adjustment’ can not readily be achieved without conceptual violence and social antagonism (‘Abortive redemption’, p 240).
- ⁷⁰ Chakrabarty, *Provincialising Europe*, pp 106, 112.